This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first-and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as of the auction theory in general, by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental evidence provides strong support for the theory, and sheds light on the roles of risk aversion and the spite motive in first-and second-price auctions, respectively.
Introduction
This paper studies experimentally how bidders' knowledge of their rivals' types affects their behavior in standard auctions. The theoretical relevance of such knowledge has been established by Kim and Che (2004) (hereafter KC).
1 They demonstrated how bidders react differently to the knowledge of their rivals' types in different auction formats.
In a first-price sealed-bid auction, knowledge about their rivals causes bidders to refine their bidding strategies based on that knowledge, so any asymmetry in the bidders' knowledge about their rivals leads to an inefficient allocation as well as suboptimal revenue, even when bidders are ex ante symmetric. By contrast, bidders' knowledge about rivals should have no effect in a second-price sealed-bid auction since they have a dominant strategy of bidding their valuations. In fact, KC have identified precise equilibrium strategies in a number of different information structures regarding rival types, when the types are uniformly distributed. We test these predictions.
Testing these predictions can serve several useful purposes. First, bidders' knowledge of rivals' types as well as its asymmetry is quite relevant in various auction settings, such as procurement contests, privatization, and corporate takeover. These auctions typically attract bidders with a wide range of backgrounds, differing in previous industry operation as well as in previous dealings with similar auctions. These differences are likely to generate asymmetry in bidders' abilities to assess their rivals' willingness to pay. For instance, a radio frequency license auction may attract so-called incumbent firms as well as relative newcomers; and the incumbents are likely to know more about other incumbents's capabilities than those of the newcomers. Empirical testing of the hypothesized effects will help us not only to learn about the bidding behavior but also to draw relevant policy implications in these settings. Their model has arguably a more general information structure than KC, allowing bidders to have noisy signals about their rivals' types, but assumes two bidders with discrete types. Like KC, they find revenue non-equivalence between first-price and second-price auctions and allocative inefficiency of the first-price auction. 2 In addition to the standard policy instruments such as reserve prices and entry fees, the auctioneer may have some control over what information can be publicly disclosed. For instance, in a corporate Second, and perhaps more importantly, the comparative statics hypotheses on how bidders react to different rival information provide additional identifying restrictions on the theory unavailable in the extant studies, thus enabling us to test more effectively the underlying behavioral paradigm itself -namely whether bidders behave according to the Nash hypothesis. For instance, observations on how bidders adjust their strategies to different information on their rivals in a first-price auction can produce much sharper identification on whether bidders follow the Nash paradigm than previous experiments measuring the degree of bid shading or ones comparing the revenue between first-and second-price auctions. Examining the amounts of bid shading may not effectively distinguish the Nash behavior from, say, an alternative hypothesis that bidders follow a naive rule of thumb. Likewise, revenue comparison across auction formats may be subject to risk aversion and other behavioral motives that may affect the formats differently but are difficult to control for in an empirical setting. 3 Further, the celebrated dominance hypothesis in a second-price auction can be tested more effectively when bidders are subject to additional information that should not affect their behavior if the hypothesis were true.
Finally, our rich comparative statics hypotheses can provide a better handle on such uncontrollables as bidder risk aversion or "behavioral" motives, and may thus clarify some of the anomalies observed in the past auction experiments. In particular, they reported overbidding in first-and second-price auctions relative to theoretical predictions. While bidders' risk aversion and their strategic mistakes or their "spite" motive have been blamed for the overbidding respectively in the first-and second-price auctakeover, the degree to which the target firm's financial status and dealings are revealed can be a choice variable. A similar choice is available in the sale of real estate, e.g., condominiums, in terms of the specific location, blue prints and orientation. The information on these aspects often has different implications for different bidders, much as assumed in the model of KC. See Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) and Eso and Szentes (2003) on the theoretical analysis of the issue. 3 Risk aversion may affect the revenue performance of a first-price auction, but not that of a secondprice auction (given the dominance of bidding one's valuation in the latter). Meanwhile, a loser's ability to influence the selling price in the latter may lead to "spite" motivated overbidding there, but not in a first-price auction.
tions, there has been disagreement in the literature on their effects. 4 The change in information about rivals can serve as a useful instrument to control for the presence of risk aversion in the case of first-price auction and to clarify the validity of the competing explanations for overbidding in the second-price auction.
To test these hypotheses properly, not only must the researcher have clear knowledge of the information bidders have about their rivals, but the nature of the bidders' information must also conform to that assumed in the model. While these features are unlikely to be met in real auctions (and the data), a lab experiment can easily be designed to replicate the precise information structures assumed in the model. For this reason, we adopt a lab experiment as a method of test.
In the experiment, subjects play a sequence of auctions with increasingly more information about their rivals' types. More specifically, each round of an experiment selects a set of four bidders to play three auction games. Another set of hypotheses deals with the effect on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency. In a first-price auction, revenue as well as efficiency varies non-monotonically, dropping initially as bidders' information about rivals shifts from no information (Auction 1) to information about one rival (Auction 2) but rising thereafter when it shifts to information about all rivals (Auction 3). By contrast, no change in revenue or efficiency is predicted for the second-price auction. Given the simple and explicit form of equilibrium bidding function found in the case of the uniform distribution and risk neutral bidders, we can obtain quantitative measures of revenue and surplus for both auction formats. These measures are then used to check how closely the theory approximates the real data.
These hypotheses receive strong support from our experimental data. The observed patterns of bid shading relative to own valuations as well as of the adjustment of bids to the learning of rivals' types in a first-price auction matched closely those predicted by the theory. The experiment on the second-price auction lends support to the dominance hypothesis, as a large portion of subjects bid close to their valuations and do not display much sensitivity to the information about their rivals. As with the extant auction experiments, some overbidding was observed in both formats, while some underbidding was observed in a second-price auction. Overbidding was more pronounced in a firstprice auction when the value of the main competitor is unknown, which lends credence to the view that risk aversion is a source of overbidding. In a second-price auction, underbidding dissipates in later rounds, indicating that strategic mistakes may have been a factor, but overbidding remained a pattern throughout. Moreover, overbidding is more pronounced when a bidder is convinced of losing and in a position to set the selling price, based on rivals' information, which suggests that the "spite" motive is the likely cause of this overbidding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical results and presents testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes an experiment designed to test them. In Section 4, reports experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
Theory Review and Testable Hypotheses
A unit of a good is auctioned off to n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders each with a valuation drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. The valuation distribution is common knowledge to all bidders, but bidders may know the realized valuations of some rivals. Formally, bidders are partitioned into "knowledge groups" such that they know the realized valuations of the rivals within the same group, while they know only the distribution of types for bidders outside their group. This partition model is convenient for modeling different information structures regarding rivals' types. Suppose that n bidders are partitioned into k knowledge groups of m bidders in each group, a situation called a "k × m partition." For each partition, we study a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of each auction game in undominated strategies. Excluding weakly dominated strategies serves the purpose of pruning out unreasonable equilibria present in a Bertrand game and a second-price auction. 6 The following hypotheses are derived from KC (2004).
5 KC (2004) consider an arbitrary partition structure, including possibly an asymmetric structure.
Assuming symmetry in the partition structure yields a closed-form characterization of equilibrium, which is convenient for the purposes of an experiment. 6 A Bertrand game has equilibria in which the stronger bidder bids strictly higher than the valuation of second-highest valuation bidder, for fear of the latter bidding above his valuation. Meanwhile, a second-price auction admits equilibria in which the strongest bidder loses to a weaker bidder bidding strictly higher than his valuation. Both types of equilibria are supported by weakly dominated strategies, however.
Equilibrium Behavior in the First-Price Auction
In a first-price auction, bidders shade their bids to obtain a surplus upon winning, and the amount of shading depends on rivals' bidding behavior. If the rivals bid aggressively, then a bidder may not shade much, for instance. By the same token, bidders facing rivals with high valuations may bid more aggressively. For this reason, knowing rivals' types leads bidders to alter the extent to which they shade their bids. This is the main feature of equilibrium prediction described below.
For the case of a k × m partition with valuations drawn uniformly from [0, 1], we have a closed-form characterization for the equilibrium bidding strategies. To describe the latter, it is useful to distinguish a bidder with the highest valuation and the one with the second highest valuation in a group, respectively called "leader" and "follower." In the trivial case m = 1, each group has only one bidder, so he will be treated as a leader.
We begin with the leader's strategy:
In a first-price auction, a leader with valuation v facing a follower with valuation v f bids
where v f is set equal to 0 when m = 1.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix. According to this proposition, a leader bids between his valuation and the second highest valuation within his group in a particular fashion: he combines the bidding strategy familiar from the standard first-price auction with a Bertrand behavior. Specifically, a leader follows an unconstrained bidding strategy,
v , which depends only on his valuation, except when the follower's valuation, v f , "binds" in the sense that β m (v ) falls short of v f . In the latter case, the leader adopts the Bertrand behavior, matching the following 7 This assumes that ties are broken in favor of the leader (see KC [2004] ), for a similar reason that the tie-breaking rule is adopted in a Bertrand game. This tie-breaking rule is not necessary, though, if the valuations are discrete, as is the case with our experiment. For this reason, the issue of the tie-breaking rule does not arise in our experiment; and we simply adopt the usual random tie-breaking rule.
valuation precisely. 8 Interestingly, the unconstrained strategy β m (v ) is precisely the strategy a bidder would adopt in a standard first-price auction with n − m + 1 bidders, with no information about rivals (i.e., (n − m + 1) × 1 partition). That is, if "not constrained" by the group members, a leader acts as if there are only n − m outsider rivals, completely ignoring the m − 1 within-group rivals.
Inspecting how the leader's bidding strategy changes with the information structure reveals several testable hypotheses. Fixing n = 4, we can write the leader's equilibrium strategy in auction a = 1, 2, 3 as
Then, FPBL yields the following predictions on the coefficients, B a 1 and B a 2 .
• FPBL1: The coefficients, B a 1 and B a 2 , in a leader's equilibrium strategy take the following values in auction a = 1, 2, 3:
Notice that a shift from Auction 1 to Auction 2 causes group leaders to bid less aggressively, unless constrained by the followers' valuations.
FPBL further generates implications on how the leader would react to knowledge of the follower's valuation once it becomes known to him.
• FPBL2: For Auction a = 2, 3, the following holds:
8 When the valuation support is discrete, as in our experiment, a Bertrand behavior will be to match the follower's valuation or bid a unit above that valuation, depending on the fineness of the support. 9 Auction 1 has no follower, so B According to FPBL2, if a bidder realizes that he bid higher than the highest rival valuation in his group in Auction 1 (i.e., without knowing the rival valuations), he adjusts his bid downward in Auction 2 and 3 (i.e., after realizing those rival valuations). On the other hand, if he realizes that he bid less than some valuations of his within-group rivals and his valuation exceeds these rival valuations, then he adjusts his bid upward to match the highest within-group rival valuation. As will be seen, the design of our experiment will enable us to test this particular hypothesis.
FPBL can also be tested based on its implication on the correlation between a leader's bid and a follower's valuation:
• FPBL3: An Auction 2 leader's Auction 2 bid is more highly correlated with the valuation of the follower in his group than is his Auction 1 bid. The Auction 3 leader's bid is more highly correlated with the Auction 3 follower's valuation than his own valuation.
Despite the independence in valuation distribution, there is a selection-induced correlation between an Auction 2 leader's Auction 1 bid and his follower's valuation: The higher the leader's valuation, the higher the within-group follower's valuation is likely to be, simply because the support of the latter is chosen conditionally on the former's valuation. Since the former's equilibrium bidding strategy in Auction 1 is monotone increasing in his valuation, there exists a positive correlation between the two values. This correlation is again present in Auction 2 between the two values, but there is a tighter correlation due to the Bertrand effect, which arises whenever the follower's valuation is binding. In Auction 3, the correlation coefficient between the leader's bid and the follower's valuation becomes 1, implying that the leader's bid is more highly correlated with the follower's value than his own value. These relationships between correlation coefficients provides an additional way of testing if a leader's bidding strategy adjusts to his rival information according to the theoretical predictions.
Next, we turn to the equilibrium predictions for the follower.
• FPBF: In a first-price auction, a follower bids no higher than his valuation in Auctions 2 and 3.
A follower's equilibrium strategy is not pinned down in the Bertrand-type situation wherein the leader bids the follower's valuation, in both Auctions 2 and 3. It is an equilibrium behavior for the follower to bid below his valuation with some probability, since the follower earns zero payoff in equilibrium and the leader will not be tempted to deviate as long as the follower puts a sufficient probability mass/density close to his valuation. 10 In Auction 2, if a group leader bids strictly above the follower's valuation (i.e., the latter is not binding), any bid below the follower's valuation can be an equilibrium response. Such a multiplicity should be taken account of in interpreting experimental data. This multiplicity issue aside, a Bertrand game presents an additional difficulty in interpreting the follower's behavior. As is well known, a follower does not have a unique best response (even when he has a unique equilibrium response); any bid below or equal to his valuation would be optimal. For this reason, while experimental data showing the follower's bid is below his value does not necessarily refute the equilibrium prediction, the follower's bid equal to his value will strongly support the theory.
Remark 1 (Risk aversion) One element of the theory that cannot be replicated in an experiment is the risk neutrality of bidders, for the risk attitudes of the subjects cannot be controlled. 11 Nevertheless, our hypotheses provide a better handle on this issues than in the previous studies. First, Bertrand behavior is not subject to bidders' risk attitudes, so the follower's behavior in FPBF and the dependence of a leader's bid on the follower's valuation -coefficients B 2 -are robust to the risk aversion issue. Likewise, the qualitative response by a leader to the rival information, as described in FPBL2 and 10 In fact, given a random tie-breaking rule and a continuous strategy space, any equilibrium response by the follower must involve randomizing below his valuation (See Blume (2003) ). Given a discrete strategy space (which is more relevant for our experiment), bidding one's valuation with probability one can be supported as an equilibrium (if the leader bids a unit above it with probability one), but bidding below his valuation can be also supported as an equilibrium.
11 There is considerable debate in experimental circles about whether this is in fact true. An influential paper by Roth and Malouf (1979) provides a methodology for inducing risk neutrality by paying subjects with lottery tickets over a binary lottery, rather than cash. The reasoning is that even risk averse people are risk neutral in probability. Very few studies have directly tested the efficacy of the Roth-Malouf technique. Selten, Sadrieh, and Abbink (1999) summarize the literature and conduct a direct test.
They are harshly critical of the method, suggesting it makes inference even more difficult.
FPBL3, are robust to the bidders' risk attitudes. The only elements of the predictions that are susceptible to risk aversion are the two coefficients B 1 1 and B 2 1 , i.e., the dependence of a leader's bid on his own valuation in Auctions 1 and 2. Risk aversion of a bidder will imply overbidding relative to the theoretical predictions in this case, thus higher estimated values of the coefficients than the respective predictions, 3/4 and 2/3. In fact, the pattern of overbidding can help reveal its source in testing risk aversion, for instance, against a possible alternative hypothesis of a "joy-of-winning bias." If risk aversion is at work, then bidders face more uncertainty in Auctions 1 and 2 relative to Auction 3, so the overbidding would be more pronounced in former auctions than in the latter, whereas the joy-of-winning hypothesis would imply no such pattern of overbidding. In fact, the latter theory may imply even deviations from the Bertrand behavior.
Equilibrium Behavior in the Second-Price Auction
In a private value environment, it is well-known that bidders in a second-price auction (or English auction) have a weakly dominant strategy of bidding their valuations. The weak dominance of this "truthful bidding" means that, unlike a first-price auction, information about rivals' valuations should have no impact on bidding behavior in a second-price auction.
• SPB: (Truthful bidding) In a second-price auction, the bidders bid their valuations, regardless of the partition structure.
As mentioned above, subjecting bidders to different information about rivals provides a tighter identifying restriction than has been available in past experiments, thus helping to test the validity of the dominance hypothesis.
Remark 2 (Strategic mistakes vs. spite motive) Overbidding has been observed in previous experiments of second-price auctions (e.g., see Kagel and Levin, 1993) . Such deviations from weakly dominant strategies may result from computational mistakes on the part of the bidders or from their bias toward winning. Alternatively, the deviations may be attributed to behavioral motives such as "spite." For instance, Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis (2003) suggested that bidders may have an incentive to hurt their rivals, by rais-ing bids above their valuations in case they lose. Our model can provide an opportunity to gain better understanding of the source of overbidding to the extent that overbidding is a systematic phenomenon. If the spite motive is in fact the driving force behind the overbidding, overbidding will be more pronounced with bidders who are convinced of losing and are in position to hurt the winner. It then follows that the overbidding is more likely (1) when a bidder is a "follower" than when he is a "leader" and (2) when a leader's valuation is known (since a follower can safely inflate the selling price without risking an unprofitable win). No such pattern of overbidding relative to a bidder's identity or to the knowledge about rival types is expected if the reason behind overbidding were strategic mistakes or a joy-of-winning bias. Further, the 'strategic mistakes' theory would imply that the overbidding will abate as bidders gain more experience whereas the spiteful overbidding will not diminish with experience. These aspects of behavior will be examined in Section 4.
Revenue and Surplus Performances
We can draw revenue and surplus implications from the bidding behavior presented above. In a second-price auction, SPB immediately implies the following hypothesis:
• SPRS: A second-price auction generates the same full surplus and revenue irrespective of the partition structure.
By contrast, in a first-price auction the dependence of a bidder's equilibrium bid on his within-group rivals' valuations means that the information about rivals' types has a nontrivial impact on the surplus and revenue. Clearly, in Auction 1 (no information about rivals) and Auction 3 (full information about rivals) the good is allocated efficiently and the revenue equals the second-highest valuation. In auction 2 (i.e., 2 × 2 partition), the leaders of the two groups will likely bid different amounts, even when they have the same valuation, if they face within-group rivals with different valuations. Hence, the allocation is generally inefficient, and KC (2004) show that this inefficiency leads to a lower expected revenue than in Auction 1 or 3. The result is summarized as follows: FPRS implies that total surplus and revenue vary non-monotonically with a shift from Auction 1 through Auction 2 to Auction 3. They first drop when the partition structure shifts from "no information about rivals" to "information about some rivals," and they rise back to the original levels with the shift to "full information about rivals."
Remark 3 Bidder risk aversion will affect the revenue and surplus implications in a first-price auction. As mentioned earlier, though, the effect varies across the information structures. Risk aversion should have no effect in Auction 3, will cause leaders to overbid when followers' valuations are not binding in Auction 2, and it will cause all bidders to overbid in Auction 1. Consequently, even with a bidder risk aversion the prediction of a revenue decrease from a shift to Auction 1 to Auction 2 should not be affected, whereas the predicted revenue rise when moving from Auction 2 to Auction 3 may be dampened or reversed. Finally, overbidding may arise in a second price auction, for the reason described above. If a spite motive is present, the overbidding will be more pronounced as more information about rivals becomes available, causing the revenue to rise with a shift from Auction 1 to Auction 2, and to Auction 3.
Experiment Design
Each session of the experiment involved 20 subjects playing 30 rounds of auction games.
We ran two sessions each of the first-and second-price auctions, for a total of 80 subjects.
The subjects were volunteers from undergraduate economics courses. Each session lasted less than two hours. Subjects were each given $4.96 in their earnings account at the auction in Auction 2 (see KC (2004)). While this latter result can be tested in principle, the magnitude of revenue difference may not be sufficiently large to ensure a meaningful test. Moreover, revenue comparisons across different formats is susceptible to risk aversion and other behavioral issues that cannot be controlled by an experiment and can affect the formats differently. Revenue equivalence in the standard symmetric independent-private-values environment has not been reliably confirmed or refuted for this reason (see Kagel (1995) ). In each round, the 20 subjects were randomly divided into 5 cohorts of 4 bidders. These 4 bidders then played Auction 1 (4 × 1 partition), Auction 2 (2 × 2 partition), and Auction 3 (1 × 4 partition) of a given format sequentially, using an (extended) dual market technique. More specifically, in any given round, bidders were initially assigned valuations drawn from the uniform distribution over integers ranging from 0 to 100, and these same valuation profiles were kept throughout that round. Keeping the same valuations while changing the information each bidder has about their rivals enables us to isolate the effect of the rival information, thus preserving the "purity of the ceteris paribus presumption" (see Kagel, 1995) . Hence, the (extended) dual market technique makes the testing of our comparative static hypotheses more effective. To maintain the assumed informational structure, bidders were informed of the outcome of all three auctions only at the end of the round, when all three auctions were concluded.
The bidders' identities were unknown to all other bidders to prevent the repeatedgame effects. The winning bid, the price, and the winner's profit were posted at the end of each round for all three auctions. The valuations assigned to bidders as well as their bids were in discrete integer (or token) units ranging from 1 to 100 with no ceiling on a possible bid. A single token was exchanged for 8 cents, meanging that a subject could earn at most 8 dollars in a given auction game, and 24 dollars in any session. A copy of the instructions can be obtained from the authors.
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Since each of the 30 rounds contained 3 auctions and 5 distinct groups, each session included 150 auctions of each of the three types. We ran two sessions for each of the first-and second-price auctions, thus we obtained 300 observations for each partition of first-price and second-price auctions.
Results
We now present the results of our experiment. We first examine the bidding behavior in the first and second price auctions, and then move on to the revenue and surplus in these formats.
Bidding Behavior in the First-Price Auction
We begin with the most general prediction, FPBL3. Table 1 reports the correlation coefficients between group leaders' bids and their valuations and that between the leaders' bids and their group followers' valuations. It confirms the hypotheses that the correlations between a leaders' bids and followers' values rises from Auction 1 (0.38) to Auction 2 (0.57). Note also that in Auction 3, the correlation between the leader's bid and value (0.59) is less than the correlation between the leaders' value and that of the follower (0.86), as hypothesized in FPBL3.
Next, Table 2 presents the results of the regression equations discussed in FPBL1:
for Auction a = 1, 2, 3. We assume that error terms, ε a i , are independent across bidders and rounds. One possible interpretation of the errors is that they represent random mistakes in calculating the optimal bids. We employed the non-linear least squares method based on (??). The coefficients estimated show how the subjects adjust their bids in response to the information gained about their rivals' types. Overall, the estimated coefficients closely track the theoretical predictions in FPBL1. In particular, the coefficients on the followers' valuations, B 14 The coefficients on own valuations, B respectively. 15 For B 
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More importantly, the decrease in the coefficient on the bidder's own value when shifting from Auction 1 and Auction 2 confirms that the bidders shade more when they realize within group rivals with sufficient low valuations, which is again consistent with the way bidders were hypothesized to react to the knowledge of their rivals' types. Hence, these results favor a theory of risk aversion over joy-of-winning bias. Turning to Auction 3, Table 4 largely supports the hypothesized Bertrand behavior, from both leaders and followers. Specifically, about 61 percent of the leaders' bids match the equilibrium predictions.
18 About 48 percent of the followers' bids match the Bertrand predictions in the strong sense that they are equal to or a unit below their valuations.
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This is remarkable given that followers' equilibrium responses/best responses are not unique in a Bertrand game. As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, any bids below or equal to 16 Assuming CRRA utility, u(π) = π r , Cox, et al. (1988) have shown that the bid coefficients should ones' valuations are optimal and can be equilibrium behavior. In light of this, about 92 percent of all followers' bids are consistent with equilibrium/optimizing behavior. Table 5 of it may not be explainable by strategic mistakes. Indeed, the pattern of overbidding appears consistent with the theory of a "spite" motive. Consider these observations:
Bidding Behavior in the Second-Price Auction
• Overbidding is most frequent in the followers' bids in Auctions 2 and 3, and more than 90% of the overbids remain below the group leader's valuation. Both suggest that an overbidder is likely to be somebody who is convinced of losing and wishes to raise the sale price but not to the point of risking a win.
• The increase in overbids is most pronounced when the followers learn the leaders'
valuations. The followers' overbids increase by about 18% going from Auction 1 (13.8%) to 2 (31.6%), and by about 12% from Auction 2 (15.7%) to 3 (27.3%).
This is consistent with the fact that raising bids to hurt the winner becomes less risky when a follower learns of his group leader's valuation (and thus his likely bid).
• In a questionnaire administered to the subjects after the experiment, subjects were asked whether they ever bid more than their valuations. If they had overbid, then they were asked, in an open-ended question, to explain why. Examining the answers reveals that out of 40 participants, 24 report having overbid and half of them volunteered that they did so to reduce the earnings of winners. Some participants even reported that they only overbid if they are in a 'losing situation'. This is remarkable since our questionnaire never suggested any reasons to subjects.
To further understand the bidding pattern in a second-price auction, we ran reducedform regressions for leaders and for followers, where their bids were regressed on the value profile they were informed of in Auction 2 and 3:
where b a i is bidder i's bid in Auction a = 2, 3, v i is his valuation, and v m(i) is the highest valuation in his group except for his own. The estimation results are reported in Table   6 .
20 For the leaders, the estimate of the own valuation coefficient B that a bidder is willing to raise his bid most significantly relative to the leader's valuation when safe with the knowledge that he will not be winning and his bid will set the selling 20 We ran a supplementary regression with a random-effects model to account for the individual characteristics without finding the regression results much different from those of OLS regressions.
21 Testing the null hypothesis B price.
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For Auction 2, we examined the possible individual effects in overbidding through the following two regression equations:
where 1 {·} is the indicator function. The individual dummies (L i and F i 's) in these regressions account for individual differences in the sensitivity of bids to the highest rival valuations, so they can reveal whether a deviation from truthful bidding is individualspecific or specific to his status as a follower. Table 7 reports the estimation results. We find that 6 L i 's are significant (at 5% level) and 3 of them are positive, whereas 19 F i 's are significant and 15 of them are positive.
23 Notably, F i 's are positive and significant for 10 out of 13 bidders who overbid more than 30 % percent of the time in Auction 2. Further, only three of the overbidding followers (bidder number 6, 16, and 36) also overbid when they were leaders, suggesting that the overbidding is largely not individual specific, but depends on whether one is a leader or follower. In summary, the followers responded more sensitively to the rivals' valuations than the leaders, and they bid more aggressively when facing the leaders with higher valuations. Table 8 presents the theoretical predictions for revenue and surplus based on the actual value profiles as realized in the experiment. 24 The important thing to note about Table   8 is that while there are differences predicted, they are quite small relative to the natural 22 In Auction 2, a follower knows that he will not be winning but he does not know his bid will set the selling price, due to the uncertainty about the types of the other group bidders. 23 Recall that a total of 40 subjects participated in a second-price auction in Sessions 2 and 4. 24 In a Bertrand situation arising in Auction 2 and Auction 3, there are two pure strategy equilibria where a leader's bid is either the second highest value or one unit above it. We presume the two equilibrium prices to be equally probable, thus taking the second highest value plus a half token unit as our theoretical prediction.
Revenue and Surplus Performances
variance found in the data. Under the assumption of risk-neutrality, therefore, we would be surprised to find any differences to be statistically significant. Table 9 reports the actual revenue and surplus from the first-price auctions under different information structures. In a first-price auction, the revenue difference (of about 3.3 in token units) between Auction 1 and Auction 2 is in the right direction, consistent with FPRS, but more than doubles the amount predicted by the theory (about 1.5).
The revenue ranking between Auctions 2 and 3 is in the wrong direction although it is not significant. Also, the revenue equivalence between Auction 1 and Auction 3 is rejected at 1% significance level. While these findings may appear at odds with FPRS, they can be reconciled by the presence of risk aversion. As noted in Remark 1, risk aversion causes bidders to be more aggressive when facing more uncertainties, which could explain the amplified revenue ranking between Auctions 1 and 2 and the reversal of the predicted ranking between Auction 2 and 3. Total surplus should be less susceptible to the risk aversion effect if the degree of risk aversion is similar across the bidders.
Indeed, the surplus rankings across different information structures are consistent with FPRS, exhibiting the non-monotonicity, though not significantly. Table 10 reports the revenue and surplus observed from our second-price auction experiment. Their theoretical predictions are the same as those in Auctions 1 and 3 of a first-price auction (in Table 8 ). According to SPRS, the revenue and surplus
should not depend on the information structure. This hypothesis is rejected for nearly all the binary comparisons, as shown in the Table 10 . Indeed, Table 10 shows that revealing information about more rivals to the bidders results in higher revenue and, less significantly, lower surplus. This behavior seems consistent with aforementioned overbidding by the followers, which becomes more pronounced as they gain information about rivals. In a second-price auction, a follower's overbidding raises the selling price (and thus revenue) and this can cause an inefficient allocation if a leader underbids.
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25 Note that a defensive action against spiteful opponents is for leader to bid below his value (but above the follower's) thus putting spiteful followers at risk. Unfortunately, we have no way of testing this "reciprocal spite" motive in our data.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied experimentally the effect bidder's information about rivals' types has on The comparative statics hypotheses provide additional identifying restrictions on the theory that are largely robust to risk aversion and other behavioral motives that some past auction experiments were susceptible to. Thus, our experimental support of the theory appears to provide a more compelling endorsement for the underlying gametheoretic paradigm as a behavioral framework than has been possible with previous auction experiments. Further, the enhanced control on the behavioral issues and risk attitudes could provide a better understanding on the roles they play in auction experiments. In particular, our study adds credibility to the view that risk aversion and a spite motive may have caused subjects to overbid respectively in first-and second-price auction experiments. Table 3 : Bid in Auction 3 of the first-price auction
Tables
61.0 27.0 12.0 
36.8 49.2 12.5 1.5 a. This number is the average of (v 2 + 0.5), where v 2 is the follower's value. Note: Theoretical values of surplus and revenue are 77.68 and 56.49, resp. a. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is rejected at 1% level in favor of the alternative hypothesis that it is negative. b. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is not rejected at 1% level but rejected at 5% in favor of the alternative hypothesis that it is positive. c. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is not rejected at 10 % level. d. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is rejected at 1% level in favor of the alternative hypothesis that it is positive.
